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Abstract — The existing power grid infrastructures in many 
countries are primarily based on technologies that have been 
developed as centralized systems in which power is generated at 
major power plants and distributed to consumers through 
transmission and distribution lines. In the recent decade, with the 
increasing penetration of renewable energy sources such as solar 
and wind power, and smart electrical appliances, the centralized 
model may no longer hold, and the supply and demand for 
electricity become more dynamic. Moreover, the latest developed 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and power 
electronic technologies could enhance the efficiency and 
performance of power system operations. Recently, concerns with 
global warming have prompted many countries to announce 
research programs on smart grid, which is the transformation of 
the traditional electric power grid into an energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly grid by the integration of ICT, power 
electronic, storage and control technologies. With the smart grid, 
there is an opportunity for a new operating paradigm that 
recognizes the changing structures of the power grid with 
renewable generation, and the high-resolution data, high speed 
communications, and high performance computation available 
with the advanced information infrastructure. A new operating 
paradigm, namely, risk-limiting dispatch, is proposed for the 
smart grid in this paper.  In addition, we have identified the 
requirements of a communication infrastructure to support this 
new operating paradigm. 
 
Keywords – Communication architecture, risk-limiting 
dispatch, smart grid.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
   Concerns with global warming prompted governments 
throughout the world to pursue policies aiming at the 
reduction of greenhouse gases, mostly carbon dioxide. 
Government policies to achieve carbon reduction in electric 
energy systems include increasing renewable energy 
penetration to reduce fossil fuels, and introducing smart grid to 
facilitate the integration of renewables into the system.  
   However, increased renewable energy generation in the 
power grid negatively impacts power system operations. Due 
to the intermittent characteristics of wind and solar, the 
outputs of wind farm and solar energy are difficult to forecast. 
A sudden change in wind conditions could result in very large 
changes in power output. It is a challenge for a system with 
large renewable generation capacities to implement real-time 
power balance. Hence, renewable energy may cause instability 
in the power grid. To accommodate high penetration of 
renewable energy sources, efficient real-time control and 
communication technologies are needed.  
   The small-scale distributed renewable energy generators 
installed at customer premises open up the possibility of users 
selling electricity to the grid. Coordinating distributed 
generators with storage (e.g., in electrical vehicles) has the 
effects of peak shaving and load shifting, hence implementing 
demand side response. Real-time two-way communications 
and smart meters are the basic platform for demand side 
response and demand management. 
   The smart grid brings information and communication 
technologies (ICT) to bear on the electric grid to accommodate 
renewable energy sources and, at the same time, to ensure its 
reliability on which the society depends.  
The objectives of the smart grid include (1) accommodating 
all generation, including renewable resources, and storage 
options; (2) enabling active participation by consumers in 
demand response; (3) optimizing assets and operating 
efficiency; (4) providing good power quality for electricity 
supply; (5) self-healing capability from power disturbance 
events; (6) operating resiliency against physical and cyber 
attack; and (7) enabling new products, services, and markets 
[1]. 
The European Union initiated the smart grid project in 2003 
[2]. The Electric Power Research Institute of the USA started 
the IntelliGrid project around the same time [3]. US DOE had 
a Grid 2030 project [4]. Under the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is responsible for coordinating the 
development of a framework for information management to 
achieve interoperability of smart grid devices. Currently, there 
is an urgent need to establish protocols and standards for the 
smart grid. The NIST report (Phase I) provides a conceptual 
reference model for the smart grid [5]. 
Some argue that the electric power grid with modern energy 
management system (EMS), consisting of hundreds of remote 
terminal units (RTU) sending real-time data from substations 
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spread all over the system every two seconds to the computer 
control center via supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) system and the advanced application software in the 
control center processing the data through state estimation, 
optimal power flow, etc. to ensure economic and reliable 
operation, is a smart grid already. For an introduction to 
SCAD and EMS, interested readers are referred to [6].  
However, the computer and communication technologies 
employed by EMS and SCADA systems lag behind the 
rapidly developing state of the art ICT technologies. 
Moreover, most power systems do not have real-time 
monitoring and control capability in the lower voltage 
distribution system from substation down. The push for smart 
grid is to modernize the whole electric power grid to merge it 
with the latest, as well as the emerging, information and 
communication technologies. Recent progress in Phasor 
Measurement Unit (PMU), which provides GPS time-stamped 
measurements in milliseconds opens up opportunity to 
upgrade EMS to serve a smarter transmission grid. The time 
has come for a unified smart grid for all kinds of generation, 
namely, conventional centralized large fossil-fuel generators 
to small distributed renewable generators, transmission and 
distribution networks, all the way to the consumers.  
Immediate efforts in smart grid have largely focused on the 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) that installs smart 
meters on consumer premises for demand response and the 
communication systems to connect the meters to distribution 
control centers. The work is mostly implementation of 
available technology. The next step will be the design of 
seamless integration of AMI with EMS.  
Simply building hardware for the renewable generators and 
the smart grid, but still using the same operating paradigm of 
the grid will result in limited achievement of the ultimate goal. 
Once the information infrastructure is in place, opportunity is 
ripe for a new operating paradigm that recognizes the 
changing structures of the power grid with renewable 
generation, and the high-resolution data, high speed 
communication, and high-performance computing provided by 
a unified smart grid. A new operating paradigm Risk-limiting 
Dispatch is proposed for the smart grid in this paper. The 
fundamental transformation in risk-limiting dispatch is from 
the traditional worst-case control strategy to risk-based 
control; from deterministic control to stochastic control; from 
preventive control to predictive control; from centralized 
control to distributed control.  This new paradigm will be 
discussed in detail in Section II.    In Section III, we shall 
identify the requirements of the communication architecture to 
support risk-limiting dispatch.  We conclude in Section IV. 
II. RISK-LIMITING DISPATCH  
The traditional worst-case dispatch of power system, though 
inefficient, works well for systems whose primary uncertainty 
in operation is the outage of generators and transmission 
equipments (i.e., discrete probability). However, with the 
introduction of stochastic and intermittent nature of renewable 
generation of wind and solar, it is imperative to adopt the 
probabilistic approach in power system operation. The 
resource wastage in under-dispatch of and over-reserve for 
wind and solar generation is not acceptable for the goal of 
reducing carbon emission to curb global warming. A visionary 
new approach that is compatible with the new reality of the 
future (large penetration of renewable sources and highly 
effective smart grid) is needed. The proposed new paradigm - 
risk-limiting dispatch - is based on the belief that a 
probabilistic approach provides more efficient operation of 
power systems [7] [8]. But a risk-based probabilistic approach 
with predictive control is not viable without an effective 
information infrastructure of a smart grid. 
The difficulty of current worst-case dispatch practice is that 
since (N-1) contingency analysis assumes a 0-1 failure of 
generator, transmission branch and critical devices, it must 
treat a renewable generator as an ‘equivalent’ conventional 
generator with a reliable capacity. As a result reserve capacity 
and the associated carbon emissions are not as greatly reduced 
as expected. The worst-case dispatch is like maintaining a 
large inventory in order to meet stochastic demands. Other 
industries have moved away from this paradigm to “just-in-
time” supply-chain management using information 
technology. It is time for the operation (or dispatch) of electric 
grid to move to “just-in-time” dispatch in the era of smart 
power grids. 
This new operating paradigm uses real-time information 
about supply (taking into account the stochastic nature of 
renewable sources) and demand (stochastic nature of demand 
response), obtained from smart grid hardware. The operational 
decision-making of the new operating paradigm is based on 
the criterion of limiting the risk of not meeting the operating 
constraints. 
Power system operation requires that the power must be 
balanced at all times at all points of the system (power balance 
constraints) and operating limits, such as line flow limits, 
voltage limits, stability, etc., must be satisfied (operating limit 
constraints). Depending on the time-scale of interests, power 
balance can be expressed by a set of differential equations, 
algebraic equations or both. For simplicity, we shall use 
algebraic equations to illustrate the concept here. Thus, the 
power balance constraints are expressed as ( ( ), ) 0g x t u =  
and the operating limit constraints are expressed as 
( ( ), ) 0h x t u ≤ , where ( )x t  is the state of the system at time 
t, and u is the control taken. Power generated and 
consumed at time t is determined by three decisions: the 
scheduling decision σ  taken Tσ  time units earlier 
at t Tσ− ; the recourse decision ρ  taken Tρ  time units 
earlier at time t Tρ− ; and the emergency decision ε  
taken at time t Tε− . 
Typically, at the scheduling time t Tσ− in the day-ahead 
market, the System Operator or ISO receives offers and bids 
for power to be supplied and consumed in the next 24 hours at 
‘real time’ t. ISO’s decision uσ schedules a subset of these 
offers and bids that maximizes an objective function 
( ( ), )f x t u  subject to the operating constraints. For a smart 
grid, we assume that at each t, ISO receives observations ty  so 
ISO’s information at t is },{ tsyY st ≤= . Due to the 
stochastic nature of supply (due to renewable resources) and 
demand (due to demand response), a probabilistic approach is 
necessary.  
max{ ( ( ), ) { ( ( ), ) 0, ( ( ), ) 0 }t Tf x t u P g x t u h x t u Y pσσ σ σ
∗
−
= ≤ ≥       (1) 
where p* is the desired probability, such as 0.995.  
   One hour before real time t, ISO has better information 
about the availability of generators that were scheduled in the 
day-ahead market and on demand. This information is used to 
balance any mismatch in supply and demand. This recourse 
decision is taken at a later time ( t Tρ− ), for example at the 
hour-ahead balancing market, to counter violations in 
constraints incurred by the earlier decision σu . Lastly, it may 
turn out that at real time t, or at the outset of cascading outages, 
t Tσ− , the scheduled generation is unable to meet the demand, 
in which case ISO must take an emergency decision to 
disconnect or shed sufficient load to fit the available 
generation. Hence,  
max{ ( ( ), ) { ( ( ), ) 0, ( ( ), ) 0 }t Tf x t u P g x t u h x t u Y pρρ ρ ρ ρ
∗
−
= ≤ ≥       (2) 
max{ ( ( ), ) { ( ( ), ) 0, ( ( ), ) 0 } 1t Tf x t u P g x t u h x t u Y εε ε ε −= ≤ =       (3) 
   We call the risk-based control of power system operation, 
formulation in (1) - (3) above, the risk-limiting dispatch. It 
explicit incorporates renewable resource uncertainties, smart 
grid measurements, and the reliability of power system 
operation.  
   Risk-limiting dispatch relies on the ability of the smart grid 
to provide event prediction and handling capability. In the 
current power system operation, voltages and currents of most 
nodes and lines are measured and monitored by the system 
control center. The voltage and current information are 
analyzed to estimate the system operation states and to 
forecast emergency states. When a fault occurs, the power 
system protection system detects the abnormal voltage and 
current, calculates the possible location of the fault, and 
isolates the fault by disconnecting the fault from the rest of the 
system. The actions of the traditional protection system mostly 
rely only on voltage and current information measured at 
different locations. The limited unsynchronized information 
may result in inaccurate localization of faults. The other issue 
is that the abnormal voltages and currents are the results of 
faults. They can be detected only after the occurrences of 
faults. This means that current protection systems can only 
detect a fault afterwards, and they focus on minimizing the 
impacts of the fault to the rest of the system. 
To predict fault events and protect power systems in 
advance, additional information beyond the above power 
system parameters are required. With the recently developed 
sensor and communication technologies, some non-electrical 
information of power systems can be measured and 
communicated in real time. The information include, for 
example, winding temperature, insulation oil temperature and 
composition, transmission line sag, insulation of underground 
cable, and insulation of high voltage devices, etc. The non-
electrical information can help identify the stressed power 
components in advance, and predict equipment faults 
beforehand. 
III. COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR RISK-
LIMITING DISPATCH 
It has been advocated [9] that there is a need of an 
electricity communication superhighway for supporting 
generation, transmission, substations, consumers, and 
distribution and delivery controllers. The challenge in creating 
the power delivery system is the development of a 
communication infrastructure to support universal 
connectivity and interconnection-wide real time monitoring. 
Multiple recipients must be able to receive updates of the 
system status in real-time but they may have various latency 
and rate requirements. In particular, our analyses of the 
requirements of the smart grid and of risk-limiting dispatch 
reveal the following requirements for the communication 
infrastructure: 
 
1. Capability to transport large volume of data:  To enable 
risk-limiting dispatch, the time resolution of data is in 
milliseconds.  In addition, there will be a large variety 
of data generated not only by the power generators, but 
also by the consumers, and the distribution system.  
Therefore, the volume of data generated is expected to 
be many-fold the volume of data generated today. 
2. Extensive coverage: The network must cover the whole 
power generation, distribution, and consumption 
network, all the way to the customer premises. 
3. Quality of Service (QoS) support:  The system must 
satisfy very stringent reliability, delay, and throughput 
constraints. 
4. Cyber security:  The system must be protected against 
cyber attacks. 
 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems are currently employed as the core of the 
communication system for monitoring and controlling a wide-
area, geographically dispersed power grid.  These SCADA 
systems have fundamental limitations. SCADA is associated 
with a star network with point-to-point links connecting 
substations to control centers. As a control centre polls each 
substation for control data once every two to four seconds, the 
power grid can fall behind when it undergoes some disruptive 
events [10] [11]. 
To provide reliable data delivery, some projects in the 
power industry have employed the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) [12] [13]. Yet, TCP is a best effort, in-order 
reliable packet delivery transport layer protocol for any two 
communicating devices. It neither supports multicasting and 
spatial redundancy, nor offers any real-time quality of service 
(QoS) guarantees. Hence, TCP is inadequate for many real-
time mission-critical applications, such as grid 
communications, which have very stringent QoS requirements. 
The Internet Protocol security (IPsec) [14] has been proposed 
to provide security services for the Internet traffic.  IPsec has 
recently been extended to support multicasting [15], but it only 
supports a uniform security policy per group. In addition, it 
does not defend against outsider attacks (such as a denial-of-
service attack), and such defense is critical to the vulnerability 
of the smart grid. 
Information architecture for supporting fault-tolerance and 
scalability requirements of a power system was proposed in 
[16]. The proposed layered architecture aims to support coarse 
real-time guarantees (typical deadlines in hours) at the top 
layer (such as the energy trading system) and fine-grain 
guarantees (at substations with deadlines in seconds) at the 
lower layers. Multi-protocol label switching (MPLS)-based 
virtual private network (VPN) through a firewall is employed 
for the provision of timely and secure information exchange 
among communicating devices. Nevertheless, it relies only on 
the existing network technology so that it is not possible to 
support any configurable, policy-based QoS guarantees 
(latency, reliability, and security level) and communication 
mechanisms. 
In [17], GridStat has been proposed as a middleware 
framework to provide flexible, robust, and secure data 
communication for the operations in a power grid. It has been 
designed to be implemented on top of any kinds of networks, 
such as IP networks and ATM networks. It aims to manage 
network resources for offering QoS-managed low-latency, 
reliable multicast delivery of information across the grid. The 
idea is to employ a publish-subscribe communication model so 
that a source announces the availability of data to the 
management plane and publishes data items, which are 
distributed to destinations as subscribers. The subscribers 
make requests to the middleware to set up paths for the 
delivery. This substantially simplifies the application 
programs. Besides, GridStat makes use of a set of 
hierarchically arranged QoS brokers and a set of status routers 
for the provision of scalable policy-based QoS guarantees with 
proper bandwidth allocation among various applications.  
Nevertheless, GridStat employs static routing that is more 
susceptible to network failures (such as device or link 
failures). Moreover, security and trust requirements have not 
yet been addressed. 
IEC 61850 has been adopted as a standardized 
communication technology for interoperability among 
communicating devices, known as intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs) for substation automation systems [18]. 
However, it does not devise any mechanisms for the provision 
of QoS guarantees or any delivery mechanism for wide-area 
control of a smart grid. 
A secure communication infrastructure is crucial to smart 
grid operations. In March 2009, some cyber security experts 
said that some types of smart grid sensors can be hacked easily 
[19]. On the other hand, worms can easily spread among smart 
grid sensors according to a journal article released on June 18, 
2009 [20]. We have identified several attacks which may be 
launched on the smart grid: 
 
1. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack: In a 
DDoS attack, a group of distributed and hacked sensors 
simultaneously and continuously send a large volume of 
traffic to a victim sensor or even the central server. As a 
result, normal data cannot be handled properly. 
Methodologies should be developed to enable a 
network node (i.e. the sensor) to identify that the 
network traffic is authentic, and in case a network node 
malfunctions, allow other nodes to become aware of 
this fact. 
2. Simultaneous shut-down attack: An attacker (as a 
malicious server) can send out fake control messages to 
instruct thousands or even millions of sensors to shut 
down simultaneously to render the smart grid network 
ineffective. Therefore, it is important to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity protection of 
the instructions. 
3. Fake demand for power: An attacker can intercept or 
alter messages in the network and then dramatically 
increase or decrease the demand for power. This 
disrupts the load balance maintained in the system and 
can cause a sudden power blackout. Besides, the 
attacker can also drop some of the messages so as to 
affect the statistical analysis at the central server. 
Again, it is important to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity protection of the data 
transmitted. 
 
To summarize, there is a need for a new information 
architecture that can support policy-based multicast 
communication services with a vast variety of QoS guarantees 
(in latency, reliability and fault-tolerance, and security/trust 
level) as well as the seamless interaction and interoperability 
with existing power system standards (such as IEC 61850) and 
the underlying communication networks. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources 
such as solar and wind in power systems, and the application 
of demand response and smart electrical appliances, the supply 
and demand for electricity become very dynamic. The 
traditional centralized system operation model may no longer 
hold. The infrastructure revolution of using modern 
technologies such as communication, sensor network, power 
electronics devices and control technologies can facilitate real-
time power system operation and improve operation 
efficiency. Simply building hardware for the renewable 
generators and the smart grid but still using the existing 
operating paradigm of the grid will result in limited 
achievement of the ultimate goal of carbon reduction. A new 
paradigm for power system dispatch is necessary.  A new 
operating paradigm, namely, risk-limiting dispatch, is 
proposed for the smart grid.  In addition, we have identified 
the requirements of the communication infrastructure to 
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